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Prior research has suggested that individuals import facts from the real world into fictional 
worlds and that the likelihood of importation depends on both the type of fact and the fictional 
context (Weisberg & Goodstein, 2009). Here, we extended this work to examine the importation 
of real-world morality across fictional contexts. Undergraduate participants (Study 1) and MTurk 
participants (Study 2) were randomly assigned to either a realistic or fantastical interactive 
narrative focused on competing for a job straight out of college. At seven junctions, participants 
were required to select how they would proceed with the story, with each crossroad having an 
option to behave in a Machiavellian manner, committing a moral violation for personal gain. In 
Study 3, an MTurk sample was asked to render a third-party judgment of the actions of a 
character who consistently chose the Machiavellian option. For Study 1, a gender by condition 
interaction was found, with men, but not women, electing more immoral actions in the fantasy 
condition than in the realistic one. For study 2, where the sample was older and more removed 
from the circumstances of the story, no such effect was found for first-party action. Nonetheless, 
in Study 3, participants judged immoral actions taken in the realistic condition as more immoral 
than those taken in the fantasy context. Across all iterations of the study, greater transportation 
predicted choosing fewer first-person immoral actions and judging third-person immoral actions 
more harshly.  
 




Reading is an inherently personal activity. While the words on the page remain 
consistent, the perspectives and assumptions imported into the narrative belong to the individual 
reader (Carreiras, Garnham, Oakhill, & Cain, 1996; Gerrig, 1993; Rosenblatt, 1994). Despite 
these differences, certain “facts” about fictional worlds seem to be held constant across readers. 
For example, when reading a fictional story, one does not need to be told that humans breathe 
oxygen or that gravity exists and exerts a force of 9.807 m/s²; unless told otherwise, readers will 
assume these facts to be true (Gendler, 2011; Ryan, 1980, 1991). But what about the social and 
moral rules that govern fictional worlds? The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the 
context of a fictional world—namely, whether or not that context is fantastical—affects the 
degree to which readers import real-world morality into make-believe worlds. 
There is a wealth of evidence and theory supporting the idea that our real world morality 
affects the way we approach fictional media and that fictional media can affect real world 
morality (e.g., Anderson & Dill, 2000, Bilandzic, Schnell, & Sukalla, 2019; Ciulla, 1998; Currie, 
1995, 2016; Eden, Daalmans, & Johnson, 2017; Eden, Oliver, Tamborini, Limperos, & Woolley, 
2015; Grizzard et al., 2017; Krcmar & Curtis, 2003; Lester & Weber, 2016; Schnell & Bilandzic, 
2017; Shafer, Janicke, & Siebert, 2016; Tamborini, Weber, Eden, Bowman, & Grizzard, 2010; 
Walton & Tanner, 1994; Weatherson, 2004). Indeed, Flesch (2007) suggested that a large part of 
the appeal of fiction is that fictional stories typically offer us the opportunity to see the righteous 
prevailing while wrongdoers are met with their just desserts. Affective Disposition Theory 
(ADT; Zillman & Cantor, 1977) states that we generally enjoy seeing liked characters receive 
good outcomes and disliked characters receive bad outcomes, and the extent to which we like, or 
dislike characters is derived from our perceptions of the character’s morality (Zillman, 2000). 
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Based on personal conceptualizations of morality, a viewer rejoices when those in line with 
one’s morality are rewarded and those who violate one’s morality are punished. The viewer is a 
“moral monitor,” constantly revising the moral correctness of a character’s actions as 
motivations are revealed and behaviors change. (Zillman, 2000).  Thus, morality may explain 
why various characters (Raney, 2011, 2017) and narratives (Raney, 2004) appeal to their 
audience. 
Strikingly, however, evidence suggests that the enjoyment of characters is not wholly 
restricted to characters that are traditionally “good.” The enjoyment of morally ambiguous 
characters, or even villains, has also been explored in detail (Black, Helmy, Robson, & Barnes, 
2018; Eden, Grizzard, & Lewis, 2011; Janicke & Raney, 2015; Krakowiak & Oliver, 2012; 
Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogel, 2013, 2015; Shafer & Raney, 2012; van Ommen, Daalmans, & 
Weijers, 2014). It is easy to find examples of immoral protagonists in popular media, such as 
Frank Underwood of House of Cards and Walter White of Breaking Bad (e.g., Salgaro & 
Tourhout, 2018; Vaage, 2015). Morally ambiguous characters may be more complex than the 
traditional black-and-white conception of heroes and villains, often displaying both moral and 
immoral traits (Krakowiak & Oliver, 2012; Eden et al., 2015). Black and colleagues (2018) 
highlight the mechanisms by which the enjoyment of “dark” fictional characters may arise. The 
greater complexity of these characters and the relatability of the situations in which they find 
themselves may lead to greater identification on behalf of the viewer, due to increased similarity 
(Cohen, 2001; Konijn & Hoorn, 2005). We may also take enjoyment from the dramatic 
situations and emotional turmoil these characters experience and create (Breithaupt, 2015; 
Salgaro & Tourhout, 2018). Notably, prior research has shown that feeling empathy for either 
moral or immoral characters may increase the effects of playing video games on real-world 
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moral behavior (Happ, Melzer, Steffgen, 2015), and it has been suggested that, in the context of 
fiction, empathy can be separated from morality (Salgaro & Tourhout, 2018). Significantly, 
identifying with and liking a character may encourage greater forgiveness of immoral actions in 
order to preserve positive perceptions (Raney, 2004, 2011).  
Moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999, 2006), a process by which one avoids moral 
agency by denying that a harm has been committed or justifying immoral behavior, has been 
documented as a mechanism that leads to the enjoyment of immoral fictional characters (Janicke 
& Raney, 2018; Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogel, 2013; Sanders & Tsay-Vogel, 2016). In fiction, no 
real harms are committed, and there are no real victims; this provides the reader fictional relief, 
freeing them from considering the consequences of actions unfolding before them (Vaage, 2013) 
and allowing the audience to focus more on emotion, rather than rational thought in evaluating 
moral actions (Vaage, 2015).  Similarly, moral disengagement may play a key role in 
engagement with violent video games, where the player is actually acting violently within the 
game-world themselves (Hartman & Vorderer, 2010).  
Thus, prior research and theory suggests both that real-world morality plays a key role in 
narrative preferences and that audiences may go through a process of moral disengagement in 
order to enjoy immoral characters; however, less is known about the properties of a narrative that 
may make it easier for audiences to leave their real-world morality behind. Information derived 
from fiction can be compartmentalized (Gerrig & Prentice, 1991), but some stories are more 
obviously fictional than others.  To what degree does the context of a narrative—and 
particularly, realism—play in how we judge the morality of fictional characters or actions? Here, 
we are interested specifically in fantasy content. Do we hold characters in worlds far removed 
from our own to the same moral standard as those in realistic stories? The purpose of the current 
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study was to examine whether the extent to which a story world differs from reality affects the 
degree to which the audience imports real-world morality into the story.   
Prior research has investigated the role that distance from reality plays in the importation 
of mathematical, scientific, contingent (e.g., “Washington, DC is the Capitol of the United 
States”), and conventional (e.g., “It is rude to pick your nose”) facts. Weisberg & Goodstein 
(2009) assigned readers to read different versions of the same story, which differed in their 
distance from reality. Distance, as conceptualized by Weisberg & Goodstein, is the extent to 
which a fictional world differs from our own, as operationalized by the number of reality 
violations (e.g., impossible or magical content) the story contains. A realistic novel that seems to 
take place in our world would be considered close; a fantasy story with magic and potions would 
be very far. In an experimental study, Weisberg and Goodstein found that both the distance of 
the story world from the real world and the type of fact affected the likelihood that participants 
would import facts from the real world to the story world. As distance from reality increased, 
less of the real world was imported into participants’ construction of fantastical worlds; however, 
some facts—namely mathematical and scientific facts—were more likely to be imported across 
worlds than others.  Notably, as distance from reality increased, conventional facts—those 
related to social norms—were less likely to be imported than mathematical or scientific facts. 
Significantly, however, this study did not investigate whether moral facts would behave similarly 
to conventional facts, or whether tenets of morality would be treated more on par with scientific 
and mathematical facts. 
This is particularly noteworthy given that moral concerns are a specific type of social 
convention that some people view as invariant across situations (Turiel, 1983, 2006). Even 
children are able to recognize this distinction and deliver differential judgment between moral 
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transgressions and conventional transgressions. While conventional transgressions can be 
forgiven in response to contextual features, transgressions against morality cannot (Killen & 
Smetana, 2015; Turiel, Smetana, & Killen, 2014). In regard to fictional scenarios, Fast & Van 
Reet (2018) demonstrate that the acceptability of prosocial behaviors and the unacceptable 
evaluation of antisocial behaviors remained constant across real and realistic pretend scenarios. 
Similarly, previous findings suggest that narratives denoted as “true stories” versus narratives 
denoted as “fictional stories” prompted equal levels of moral disengagement (Krakowiak & 
Tsay, 2011).  
Elsewhere, it has been argued that fiction writers do not have the authority to change 
morality (Levy, 2005). Whereas an authority figure (writer) can decree that a conventional rule 
does not apply within a specific fictional context, authorities do not hold such power over 
concerns of morality.  This distinction has been used to explain the phenomenon of imaginative 
resistance, where people perceive themselves as being unable to imagine worlds in which 
morality works differently (e.g., Gendler, 2000). To the extent that certain moral “facts” are 
universal across contexts and even within the imagination, we might expect that, in constructing 
fictional worlds, we should import moral principles with equal vigor to that which we ascribe to 
mathematical facts. Yet empirical research on imaginative resistance suggests that some 
individuals may either not experience it, or be able to overcome it (e.g., Barnes & Black, 2016; 
Black & Barnes, 2017). 
Strikingly, there is also work that suggests that fictionality—that is, knowing that an 
action or event is make-believe—may affect our moral intuitions in some cases. By reminding 
oneself that no real harm is committed while playing a violent video game, individuals reduce 
potential feelings of moral unease (e.g., Hartmann & Vorderer, 2010). Similarly, in a series of 
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studies conducted by Sabo & Giner-Sorolla (2017), support was found for a “fictive pass” in 
which the evaluation of fictional or imaginary violations does not always mirror the evaluation of 
equivalent real-world violations. In these studies, participants rated vignettes that were stated to 
occur in either reality or in the context of imagination (e.g., someone who imagined doing a bad 
thing, watched a character doing a bad thing in a movie, or did a bad thing while playing a video 
game). Participants were then asked to rate the moral wrongness of the violations depicted. 
Results indicated that participants deemed fictional harm violations to be less immoral and less 
indicative of bad character than real-world harm violations; however, for purity violations, 
fiction had no mitigating effect. Thus, it seems that fictionality may influence our judgment of 
some, but not all, moral violations. 
Notably, though Sabo & Giner-Sorolla (2017) looked at moral judgment of third parties 
who committed violations in either reality or imaginary contexts, this experiment did not assess 
participants’ willingness to commit these violations themselves. Furthermore, the target of the 
character judgement in the prior study was the person who was viewing the movie or playing the 
videogame, not the video game or movie characters themselves. Finally, while the fictive pass 
study adjusted the medium in which the act in question was housed (imagination, movie, or 
video game), data in the imagination condition were collapsed across these variations. Thus, the 
study focused on a binary comparison of real-world versus imagination, with all the imaginary 
contexts being realistic in nature. It is unclear, therefore, what differences in morality might be 
found between a movie, book, or video game set in a fantasy world and one set within a world 
that closely resembles our own. Fast and Van Reet (2018) manipulated fictional distance in a 
study of children’s pretend play and found that, although children import their real-world 
morality into pretense, they were more forgiving of antisocial behavior when the pretense 
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scenario was fantastical than when it was realistic. In contrast, Hartmann & Vorderer (2010) 
found that altering the target of a first-person shooter game from human to zombie-like had no 
effect on moral disengagement.   
The purpose of the current studies was to examine whether distance from the real world 
(i.e. fantasy context) affects the extent to which morality is imported into that world, both in 
terms of how willing participants are to choose to behave immorally for personal gain (Studies 1 
and 2) and in terms of their third-person evaluations of immoral behavior (Study 3). The first 
study featured an interactive narrative in which participants progressed through a job interview 
process in either a fantasy or realistic context. Participants were given the option to act in a 
Machiavellian (behaving immorally to further their own goals) or non-Machiavellian way at each 
of seven decision points. If morality is imported with equal strength across fictional contexts 
with varying degrees of fantasy content, there should be no difference in frequency with which 
participants choose the Machiavellian actions across conditions. If, on the other hand, morality is 
being imported differently in realistic and fantasy stories, then we would expect the more 
distanced fictional world to elicit less moral importation. In contrast to theories that argue that 
morality is invariant across contexts and imaginary worlds (e.g., Levy, 2005), we hypothesized 
that, like conventional facts (see Weisberg & Goodstein, 2009), real-world morality would be 
less likely to be imported into fantasy contexts than realistic, yet fictional, ones. Thus, we 
hypothesized that individuals within a fantasy context would choose more Machiavellian than 









Participants (N =208) were recruited from the psychology department subject pool; all 
participants completed the current study and then filled out survey measures of television-
viewing habits for a second, unrelated study. Participants were excluded if they spent less than 5 
minutes (15 participants) or more than one hour (11 participants) on the entire survey (inclusive 
of both studies). An additional 12 participants were excluded for not finishing the survey and 3 
for bad responding on the measure of Transportation, for a final sample of 167 students (68.9% 
female, 28.1% male, 3% gender non-binary; 79.6% White), with ages ranging between 18 and 23 
(M = 19.18, SD = 1.05). 
Procedure.  
Participants completed the Short Dark Triad (see below) and were then randomly 
assigned to read and complete either a fantastical or realistic interactive story. The Real-World 
condition had 89 participants (67.4% female, 30.3% male, 2.2% non-binary) and the Fantasy 
condition had 78 (70.5% female, 25.6% male, 3.9% non-binary). After completing this 
experiment, all participants went on to complete an unrelated experiment. Non-binary 
participants were used in all analyses where gender was not used as a covariate. 
Instrumentation. 
 Interactive narrative. An interactive narrative was created for the purpose of this study. 
The narrative placed participants in the context of obtaining a desired job and presented various 
choices along the job acquisition process. The interactive narrative began with the following 
prompt for the real-world condition, “The end of your final year of college is quickly 
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approaching. You’ve been applying for jobs constantly, but it seems like you never even make it 
to the interview stage. Your grades are decent, you’ve been involved in leadership positions in 
extracurricular activities, and you communicate clearly in written and spoken form. 
Unfortunately, you do not have much prior work experience, and it really seems like that’s 
holding you back.” Participants then read a description of a possible “dream job” that required 1-
3 years of prior work experience and had to decide at the first decision point whether or not to lie 
on their resume, taking advantage of the fact that there is another student at their school with a 
highly similar name who has completed the internship programs in question. 
 In the fantasy condition, participants read the same narrative, with fantasy terms 
sprinkled in (i.e. “college” became “magic college” and “resume” became “wizarding resume”). 
After the first decision point, participants were faced with 6 additional choice points where they 
had to choose between two options: a moral violation to improve their chances of obtaining the 
job or a morally upstanding behavior that might leave them at a disadvantage. The seven target 
immoral behaviors included: lying on a resume; endorsing a harmful stereotype to ingratiate 
yourself to a bigoted interviewer; relaying the interviewer’s prejudiced behavior to an applicant 
of the target group to dissuade them from continuing their application to the company; 
sabotaging another applicant’s messages, so that they do not receive communications from the 
company; stealing another person’s project at an audition, so that it appears they did not turn in 
any work; revealing sensitive information about your fellow applicants that make them less 
appealing to employers; and manipulating the significant other of the chosen job applicant in 
order to encourage them to turn down the job. Presentation order of the Machiavellian and non-
Machiavellian choices was randomized. Choices were coded with a 0 for a moral behavior and 1 
for an immoral behavior, thus the maximum number of immoral choices was 7. The choice 
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options, as outlined above, were designed to be in line with the Machiavellian subscale of the 
Short Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) such as “Whatever it takes, you must get the 
important people on your side.” Regardless of choice, participants progressed in identical ways 
through the process. 
 Transportation. Participants’ state transportation into the interactive story was measured 
with a 12-item scale adapted from Green and Brock’s (2000) 15-item transportation scale. All 
items were on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). (rα = .78). 
Short dark triad. The Short Dark Triad (SD3) (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) was used to 
measure participants’ level of dark triad personality traits. Subscales include Machiavellianism, 
Narcissism, and Psychopathy. Items are ranked on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Items include, “ I like to use clever manipulation to get my way” 
and “Many group activities tend to be dull without me.” Machiavellianism subscale internal 
consistency was: rα = .75.  
Results 
 Preliminary Analyses  
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to assess the relationship between the 
number of Machiavellian choices selected and potential covariates. There was a positive 
correlation between number of Machiavellian choices selected and trait Machiavellianism, 
(r(167) = .31, p < .001, 95% CI [.17, .47]). There was a negative correlation between number of 
Machiavellian choices selected and state Transportation into the narrative, (r(167) = -.230, p = 
.003, 95% CI [-.39, -.08]). There was a positive correlation between number of Machiavellian 
choices and gender (r(163) = .239, p = .002), with larger number of Machiavellian choices made 
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by men. Thus, trait Machiavellianism, state Transportation, and gender were included in 
subsequent models. 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare Transportation across our two 
interactive stories to ensure that the two conditions were equally engaging. There was no 
significant difference in state Transportation for the Realistic condition (M = 4.46, SD = .68) and 
Fantasy condition (M = 4.29, SD = .93); t(165) = 1.36, p = .176, d = 0.21, 95% CI [-.08, .42]. 
The unadjusted number of choices selected were: Real World (M = 0.80, SD = 1.25); Fantasy (M 
= 1.19, SD = 1.49) 
 Primary Analyses 
A negative binomial regression was run to predict the number of Machiavellian choices 
selected based on condition, participant gender, trait Machiavellianism, and state Transportation 
into the narrative. The negative binomial regression model was statistically significant Χ2(3) = 
16.580, p = .001. A gender by condition interaction was found Χ2(1) = 3.854, p = .050.  
To further examine these results, separate negative binomial regressions were calculated 
to compare the conditions within gender; estimated marginal means were calculated holding trait 
Machiavellianism and state transportation constant. Men were significantly more likely to 
commit moral violations in the fantasy condition (Madj = 2.30 , SE =0.45, 95% CI [1.57, 3.37]) 
than in the realistic condition (Madj = .89 , SE = .26, 95% CI [.50, 1.57]): Χ
2(1) = 7.385, p = .007. 
Females in the fantasy condition (Madj = 0.78, SE = .13, 95% CI [.57, 1.08]) were not 
significantly more likely to commit a moral violation than in the realistic condition (Madj = 0.72, 






In order to determine if there were any individual choice points driving the interaction, a 
post-hoc analysis was performed to compare males in the fantasy condition with males in the 
real-world condition across each of the seven choice points. A chi-square test of independence 
was performed for males on each choice point. Males in the fantasy condition were significantly 
more willing than those in the control to endorse a stereotype to ingratiate themselves to a 
bigoted interviewer Χ2(1) = 3.833, p = .050, ϕC = .29; to relay to an applicant of said stereotyped 
group that such sentiments were expressed in the company Χ2(1) = 3.852, p = .050, ϕC = .29; and 
to (psychically) manipulate the significant other of the candidate who received the job offer 
Χ2(1) = 5.650, p = .026, ϕC = .35. The exact wording of the choices in the fantasy condition are 
shown in Table 1.  
In order to investigate the role of transportation on moral importation, moderation 
analyses were conducted using Model 1 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012) at 10,000 
iterations. Condition (Realistic vs. Fantasy) was the predictor variable, transportation was the 
moderator, and number of Machiavellian choices was the outcome. There was no significant 
interaction between condition and transportation (β = -.066, SE = .803, p = .934, 95% CI [0.44, 
1.06]).  
Discussion 
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine whether fictional distance from the real world 
(i.e. fantasy context) affected the degree to which morality was imported into an interactive story 
world, specifically in terms of how willing participants were to choose to behave immorally for 
personal gain. Males, but not females, were more likely to choose the immoral options in a 
fantastical interactive story than in a realistic one. These results are in line with research by Fast 
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& van Reet (2018), which found that children view antisocial behaviors done in fantastical 
pretend contexts as less immoral than the same actions done in realistic pretend scenarios. These 
results suggest that, at least for the males in our sample, morality may vary with distance in a 
manner like conventional facts (e.g., Weisberg & Goodstein, 2009), rather than being held 
constant across all fictional contexts.  
As noted in the preliminary analysis, there was a negative correlation between the 
number of Machiavellian choices selected and participants’ transportation into the interactive 
narrative. Individuals who were highly transported, or more psychologically immersed (Green & 
Brock, 2000), elected to behave in less immoral ways. Given that prior research has shown a 
relationship between transportation and perceived realism of narratives (Green, 2004), it is 
possible that, across conditions, the narratives felt more “real” to participants who were highly 
transported, encouraging them to behave as they would in real life.  
An exploratory analysis revealed differences between the realistic and fantasy conditions 
on choices which featured either a fantastical marginalized group or fantastical action. For 
example, the second choice point featured an encounter in which the interviewer has some clear 
prejudice against individuals from either another race (realistic condition) or another magical 
race (fantasy condition) and to ingratiate themselves to the interviewer, readers have the option 
to indicate that they agree with such sentiments. Rather than being able to clearly picture a real-
world minority group and the types of prejudice that group may regularly face, the use of a 
magical race is more abstract; the moral norm that it is bad to be racist may not transfer to the 
more distanced “magical race.” This may have allowed for moral disengagement (e.g., Bandura, 
1999, 2002) to occur. Another choice point at which differences were found between the fantasy 
and realistic conditions was when, after receiving word that they are the backup choice for the 
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job, the participant had the option to manipulate (realistic condition) or psychically manipulate 
(fantasy condition) the significant other of the chosen applicant, so that the significant other will 
express disapproval of the effect the job will have on their relationship. The use of a fantastical 
action may, like the use of a magical race, invoke greater distance within the narrative, as the 
reader will not have experience in how one would psychically manipulate another. Thus, the 
difference in Machiavellian behavior in the fantasy and realistic conditions may depend not only 
on the distance of the story world from the real world, but also on whether or not the specific 
action was, either in target or behavior, magical in nature. 
Strikingly, in the current study, an effect was found for male participants, but not for 
female participants. This gender effect could have several explanations. Liberman, Trope, & 
Stephan (2007) notes that distanced situations (in terms of time, space, etcetera) encourage 
people to think in value terms; as a result, individuals with differing values may differ in planned 
behaviors in distanced situations. Additionally, increased psychological distance has been shown 
to minimize the perceived harm of a moral violation (McGraw & Warren, 2010).  In comparison 
to men, women possess higher moral identity and lower moral disengagement (Aquino & Reed, 
2002; Clark & Dawson, 1996; Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008; Trzebiatowska & Bruce, 
2012). Thus, it may be that the distance introduced in the fantastical context encouraged men and 
women to default to different core values. Specifically, core values that may differ between the 
emphasis on either agentic (dealing with self-advancement) or communal (dealing with the 
maintenance of positive relationships) values (e.g., Trappnell & Paulhus, 2012). Similarly, 
women and men may have made different choices in this task due in part to gender differences in 
levels of empathizing (vs systemizing) between men and women (Greenberg, Warrier, Allison, 
& Baron-Cohen, 2018) or in emotional factors associated with moral decision-making, such as 
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shame proneness, guilt, and the expectation of positive emotions from immoral decisions (Ward 
& King, 2018).  
Alternatively, it may be that the gender differences found in this experiment are the result 
of gender differences in the way that morality is being imported differently across conditions. In 
other words, it may be that men, but not women, see the immoral behaviors as more acceptable 
in a fantasy context, and that is why they are more willing to choose the Machiavellian options. 
Before exploring this possibility, we first wanted to examine whether the gender effect found 
here was an artifact of the sample used: undergraduate students in an introductory psychology 
class, which skewed female. Thus, Study 2 was run to examine whether a similar interaction 
between gender and condition would be found in a second sample, drawn from a different source 




Participants (N = 301) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is 
an online platform where workers complete tasks for compensation. Prior research has 
demonstrated that participants recruited via MTurk display similar results to and are more 
representative than convenience samples (Berinsky, Huber, Lenz, 2011); indeed, in a recent 
study, MTurk participants performed better on an attention check than subject pool participants 
(Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). Participants were excluded from the final sample for not completing 
the survey (14 participants) and poor responding on covariates (5 participants). Further, in line 
with Study 1, participants were excluded if they spent more than one hour on the survey (1 
participant) or less than five minutes for total survey duration (3 participants, all of whom were 
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already excluded for poor responding or not finishing) Additionally, to address reviewer 
concerns about the quality of responding in our MTurk sample, we also applied an exclusion 
criterion geared toward ensuring that participants spent a sufficient amount of time reading and 
responding to the interactive narrative specifically, excluding participants who completed the 
interactive narrative task faster than one standard deviation below the mean (seconds) (M = 223, 
SD = 165.30) (5 participants). The final sample consisted of  276 individuals  (39.1% female; 
72.8% White), with ages ranging from 20 to 70 (M = 35.14, SD = 10.42). Time range:15.61 
minutes. 
Procedure.  
Participants were recruited on MTurk and then randomly assigned to either the realistic 
or fantasy interactive story; the procedure and covariates used were identical to those used in 
Study 1, Machiavellianism (rα = .838).,transportation (rα = .724).  
Results 
 Preliminary Analyses 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to assess the relationship between the 
number of Machiavellian choices selected and potential covariates. As in Study 1, there was a 
positive correlation between number of Machiavellian choices selected and trait 
Machiavellianism, (r(276) = .472, p < .001, 95% CI [.37, .58]). There was a negative correlation 
between number of Machiavellian choices selected and Transportation into the narrative, (r(276) 
= -.118, p = .049, 95% CI [-.24, 0]). There was a negative correlation between number of 
Machiavellian choices and age (r(276) = -.2, p < .001, 95% CI [-.40, -.18]). The significant 
correlations among these variables warranted their inclusion in the subsequent model. An 
independent-samples t-test was also conducted to compare the levels of transportation into our 
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two interactive stories to ensure that they were equally absorbing. There was no significant 
difference in Transportation for the Realistic condition (M = 4.88, SD = .79) and Fantasy 
condition (M = 4.70, SD = .86); t(274) = 1.78, p = .08, d = 0.21, 95% CI [-.02, .37]. Overall, 
participants in Study 2 reported greater transportation than those in Study 1; t(441) = 5.09, p < . 
001. The unadjusted number of choices selected in Study 2 were: Real World (M = 1.66, SD = 
1.89); Fantasy (M = 1.70, SD = 1.83). Overall, participants in Study 2 selected more immoral 
choices than those in Study 1; t(441) = 4.40, p < .001.  
Primary Analyses  
A negative binomial regression was run to predict the number of Machiavellian choices 
selected based on condition, participant gender, age, trait Machiavellianism, and Transportation 
into the narrative. The negative binomial regression model was not statistically significant Χ2(3) 
= .903, p = .825.  There was no significant interaction between gender and condition  Χ2(1) = 
.133, p = .72.  
Discussion 
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine whether the effect found in our first study—and 
particularly the gender difference—replicated outside of a college sample. In contrast to Study 1, 
participants in Study 2 were no more likely to choose immoral, Machiavellian actions in fantasy 
contexts. A finding that was consistent across Study 1 and Study 2, however, was that increased 
transportation into the narrative resulted in fewer Machiavellian choices, suggesting that 
individuals who are more absorbed in a fictional world are more likely to make choices in line 
with real-world morality. 
The differences between Study 1 and Study 2 could be explained by a variety of factors;  
however, this difference is likely not due to lower quality responding from our MTurk sample. 
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Although we cannot directly compare the time spent on the task in Study 1 and Study 2, due to 
the fact that Study 1 participants completed additional measures after the completion of this 
study and time data was only gathered for total survey duration, it is unlikely that our MTurk 
participants spent less time on the study overall, as the exclusion criteria for Study 2 were 
slightly stricter than those used in Study 1. Further, participants in Study 2, relative to Study 1, 
were more transported into the narrative, indicating, if anything, a higher level of engagement 
with the task. Similarly, the lack of an effect in Study 2 is not due to a general reluctance to 
choose the Machiavellian option in Study 2, as participants in Study 2 chose a greater number of 
immoral choices, irrespective of condition. 
What, then, can we make of the difference across these studies? One reason that Study 2 
participants may have reacted more similarly across our two conditions involves the overall 
difference found in transportation into the narrative. As noted, participants in Study 2 were more 
transported into the narrative and, across both studies, transportation was shown to be related to 
the tendency to import real-world morality into stories. Thus, it may be that there is some kind of 
transportation threshold, under which there is an effect of fantasy versus reality, yet upon 
reaching a sufficient level of transportation, fictional distance has no impact, perhaps because the 
narrative feels more “real” regardless. This is in line with prior research showing that increased 
transportation is positively related to perceived realism of a story (Green, 2004). Notably, 
however, moderation analyses in Studies 1 and 2 individually yielded no effects. 
 Another intriguing explanation for the disparity in our results across Studies 1 and 2 
involves the age difference between our samples and the specific content of our story stimuli. 
The sample for Study 1 was made up of college students who are very close, temporally, to the 
circumstances depicted in the story, which focused on the job search process. The sample from 
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MTurk was made up of individuals who were older. For this older sample, it is possible that the 
distance between their own lives and a story focused on going through the interview process for 
a first job feels significant, regardless of whether the scenario is fantastic in nature. As outlined 
by Maglio, Trope, Liberman (2013), there is a common underlying construct to psychological 
distance, such that temporal distance is no greater or less than distance elicited through the 
hypothetical.  Additionally, the extent to which participants were motivated to “achieve the goal” 
or get the job, may have influenced how they chose to respond; younger individuals may have 
been more motivated to acquire their “first” post-college job, while older individuals may not 
have shared this motivation. 
 In order to set aside issues of motivation, Study 3 examined whether MTurk participants 
would show evidence of differential moral importation across fantastic and realistic stories with 
respect to third-party judgment.  In addition, switching to third-party judgment allowed us to 
further probe the gender effect found in Study 1, as it examines whether there are gender 
differences in moral importation when any gender differences that might exist in willingness to 
act in an immoral fashion are set aside. If there are gender differences in the way that morality is 
being imported into fantasy contexts, then we would expect third-party evaluations of immorality 
to differ across conditions for male, but not female participants. If, on the other hand, both men 
and women are importing morality differently across fantasy and realistic contexts, then we 
would expect that both men and women would evaluate the actions of a third party to be less 









Participants (N = 301) were recruited via MTurk with the same specifications as in Study 
2, during the same timeframe. Individuals who completed Study 2 were not allowed to 
participate in Study 3 and vice versa. Participants were excluded for not completing the survey 
(26 participants), poor responding on covariates (6 participants), and for being under five 
minutes in total study duration or for completing the evaluation section faster than one standard 
deviation below the mean (seconds) (M = 234, SD = 188.42) (7 participants), resulting in a final 
sample of 262 (39.3% female; 59.9% male, .8% non-binary; 73.7% White) with ages ranging 
from 18 to 70 (M = 34.20, SD = 10.37). The range in completion time was 25.86 minutes. 
Procedure. 
Participants were recruited on MTurk and then randomly assigned to read either a 
realistic or fantasy story. The method remained identical to Studies 1 and 2, except that the 
interactive narrative was adjusted so that rather than choosing actions themselves, participants 
were evaluating the moral wrongness of the actions taken by a fictional character who chose all 
the Machiavellian options from the previous studies. In order to avoid specifying the character’s 
gender, a gender-neutral name (Taylor) was used for the character, and the character was always 
referred to by name, ensuring that no gendered pronouns were used. Actions at each of the seven 
choice points outlined in Study 1 were rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all immoral) 
to 7 (very immoral).   
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Following this task, participants filled out a measure of state transportation (rα = .74)., 
Machiavellianism (rα = .88)., and demographics, as in Study 1. Non-binary participants were 
used in all analyses where gender was not used as a covariate.  
Results 
 Preliminary Analyses 
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to assess the relationship between moral 
judgment of the third party’s actions and potential covariates. There was a negative correlation 
between harshness of moral judgment and trait Machiavellianism (r(262) = -.148, p = .016), with 
those higher in trait Machiavellianism evaluating the character’s Machiavellian actions less 
harshly. There was a correlation between moral judgement and Transportation (r(262) = .231, p 
< .001; those who experienced greater transportation delivered harsher evaluations.  There was 
no significant difference in Transportation across the Real-World condition (M = 4.66, SD = .82) 
and Fantasy condition (M = 4.51, SD = .94); t(260) = 1.31, p = .191, d = .17, 95% CI [-.07, .36] . 
As in Study 2, participants from Study 3 were more transported into the narrative than 
participants in Study 1; t(427) = 2.37, p = .018.  
Primary Analyses 
An ANCOVA was conducted controlling for age, trait Machiavellianism, and state 
transportation. There was a significant effect of condition on moral judgement, such that actions 
taken in the realistic condition (Madj = 5.56, SE = 0.78, 95% CI [5.41, 5.72]) were rated as more 
immoral than actions taken in the fantasy condition (Madj = 5.33, SE = .078, 95% CI [5.17, 
5.48]); F(1,253) = 4.46, p = .036, ηp
2 = .02. There was no significant effect of gender on 
immorality judgment, F(1,253) = 1.802, p = .181, ηp
2 = .01. Trait Machiavellianism was a 
significant predictor of moral judgement (β = -.141, p = .014, 95% CI [-0.25, -0.03, ηp
2 = .02); 
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those higher in Machiavellianism rated actions as less immoral. Transportation into the narrative 
was a significant predictor of moral judgment (β = .222, p < .001, 95% CI [.11, .33], ηp
2 = .06); 
those who were highly transported delivered harsher moral judgments. Unadjusted means and 
standard deviations can be found in Table 2.  
In order to more fully examine the role of transportation, a moderation analysis was 
conducted using Model 1 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012) at 10,000 iterations. Condition 
(Realistic vs Fantasy) was the predictor variable, transportation was the moderator, moral 
judgment was the outcome. There was no significant interaction between condition and 
transportation (β = .002, SE = .014, p = .91, 95% CI [-.03, .03]).  
Exploratory Analyses. 
In order to determine if there were any individual evaluations driving the effect of 
condition on third-party moral judgment, a post-hoc analysis was performed to compare the real 
world and fantasy conditions across individual evaluations. An ANCOVA revealed that for the 
evaluation of the first action only (lying on the resume), there was a statistically significant 
difference between the realistic (Madj = 5.40, SE = .12, 95% CI [5.15, 5.64]) and fantasy (Madj = 
5.0, SE = .12, 95% CI [4.76, 5.26]) conditions, controlling for age, trait Machiavellianism, and 
state transportation, F(1,255) = 4.78, p = .030, ηp
2 = .02. In order to probe this effect further, we 
examined whether participants were spending more time on the first choice point, possibly 
indicating a higher quality of responding. Because the sections of the narrative that participants 
had to read at each choice point varied in length, we calculated the time spent per word at each of 
the seven choice points. Participants spent the most time per word on choice points 3 and 7, and 





The purpose of Study 3 was to extend the findings of Studies 1 and 2, which focused on 
how participants chose to behave in an interactive story, to third-party judgments of immoral 
behavior performed within fantastical and realistic contexts. The exploration of third-party 
judgment strove to eliminate any age-differences in motivation to land one’s first job out of 
college and to illuminate whether the gender difference from Study 1 is best explained via 
different moral standards or differences in willingness to select immoral behaviors. Participants 
who rated the behavior of a third-party, immoral actor judged the actions more harshly in a 
realistic story than in a fantastical one.  There was no effect of gender on the evaluations of 
immoral behavior. Results of the Study 3 suggests that both men and women imported morality 
differently into fantasy (versus realistic) contexts, with actions taken within fantasy held to a 
lesser standard regarding morality. A finding that was consistent across all three studies was that 
transportation was related to participants’ responding: in Study 3, increased transportation 
resulted in harsher moral judgments of the choices made by a third party.  
 In contrast to the null result in Study 2, where participants did not elect to act more 
immorally in a fantasy context, participants in Study 3 granted more latitude toward 
Machiavellian behavior in a fantasy context, suggesting an effect of context on moral 
importation. The results of Study 3 are in line with the suggestion that the null result for first-
person action in Study 2 may be related to personal distance from the circumstances of the text 
and resulting motivational differences.  Future research is needed to examine this possibility 
more thoroughly. 
 Regarding differential evaluation of individual choice points, we only found a significant 
effect of condition on the first choice point (lying on a resume), with those in the fantasy 
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condition being less harsh in their moral appraisal than those in the realistic condition. It is 
unclear what might be causing this effect, though it seems unlikely to be a decrease in the quality 
of responding as participants proceed through the task. Looking at the time spent per word of 
narrative, reading time did not systematically decrease as participants worked their way through 
the experiment. It is worth noting, however, that the first choice point was the longest piece of 
text and featured the greatest number of magical cues, suggesting that the effect may only occur 
within text of a specific length or in response to a particular number of cues. Additionally, being 
the first choice point, participants may have become more transported as the story progressed, 
thereby reducing the differences between conditions.  
 Since Study 3 shifted the focus from first-person action to third-person evaluation, it is 
more akin to prior research dealing with evaluations of or preferences for morally ambiguous or 
immoral characters (Black, Helmy, Robson, & Barnes, 2018; Eden, Grizzard, & Lewis, 2011; 
Janicke & Raney, 2015; Krakowiak & Oliver, 2012; Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogel, 2013, 2015; 
Shafer & Raney, 2012; van Ommen, Daalmans, & Weijers, 2014). The current results suggest 
that the context of the story (fantasy versus reality) may be one factor to consider in future 
research on this topic.  
General Discussion 
 Across three studies, we examined the degree to which morality was imported into 
realistic and fantastical fictional stories. In Study 1 and Study 2, participants completed an 
interactive story where they had to choose whether or not to behave in an immoral fashion for 
personal (in-story) gain. In Study 3, participants read a non-interactive version of the story in 
which a story character repeatedly behaved immorally for personal gain and were asked to rate 
the morality of those actions. Participants in Study 1 were college undergraduates, for whom the 
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story was initially written to be quite relevant; participants in Studies 2 and 3 were recruited via 
MTurk and were older and more temporally distanced from the story’s events. The results of 
these experiments suggest that morality is imported to a different extent across fictional contexts, 
at least in some cases, and that moral importation increases with greater transportation into a 
narrative, regardless of whether that narrative is fantastical or realistic.  
In the first study, a gender by condition interaction was present, in which males in a first-
person fantasy interactive narrative chose to behave more immorally than those who read a more 
realistic story. Exposing an older population, from MTurk, to the same interactive story, which 
focused on getting your first job out of college, did not yield this interaction or, indeed, any 
differences across condition. In contrast, older participants who were tasked with evaluating the 
actions of character who made the immoral choices at each of the seven decision points from the 
interactive story revealed an effect of condition, with immoral actions taken in the fantasy 
context judged less immoral than in the context of a more realistic story. Across studies, those 
who were more transported into the narrative were more likely to import real-world morality, 
choosing less immoral actions (interactive story, Studies 1 and 2) and judging a character’s 
Machiavellian actions as more immoral (Study 3). Looking more closely at the choices/actions 
that drove the significant effects found in the first study, males in the fantasy condition differed 
from males in the real world condition on actions that could be considered more distanced in 
comparison to the rest of the actions, such as gossiping about a fictional group or attempts to 
psychically manipulate someone. In contrast, third-party judgment in Study 3 revealed an item-
level difference on the first judgment, but not on subsequent judgments. 
 As a whole, this pattern of results is striking for a variety of reasons. First, although prior 
research has examined the role that fictionality plays in moral judgment (e.g., Sabo & Giner-
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Sorolla, 2017) and moral disengagement (e.g., Krakowiak & Tsay, 2011), as well as the role that 
fantasy content plays in how different kinds of facts are imported into fictional worlds (Weisberg 
& Goodstein, 2009) and the role that fantasy context plays in moral judgment in pretend play 
(Fast & Van Reet, 2018), the current research is the first that we know of to show that the 
importation of morality into fictional worlds depends not only on story content, but also on the 
participant’s degree of transportation into the narrative. Our results suggest that those who are 
more transported into the narrative are applying the moral standards of the real world to the 
fictional context to a greater degree. Importantly, the amount of transportation elicited by the 
realistic and fantasy conditions did not differ significantly. Furthermore, transportation did not 
moderate the relationship between condition and behaviors/judgments.  
Moving forward, trait level transportability should be examined to determine whether 
individuals who are more easily transported differ in their evaluations of immoral actions, or 
whether the results found here indicate that the importation of morality into fiction depends on 
the particular interaction between text and reader. In line with this latter possibility, in Study 3, 
third-person moral judgment differed significantly across conditions only at the first choice 
point. Perhaps, as the story progressed, participants experienced greater transportation as aspects 
of the fictional world unfolded around them. Future research could examine whether parallel 
effects can be found with leisure-reading (or viewing) of popular fiction: are moral violations 
encountered near the beginning of a fantastical story judged less harshly than similar violations 
that occur later on?   
 Another direction for future research involves the differences found across the interactive 
story experiments in Study 1 and Study 2. One possible reason that the effect was not replicated 
within an older population is that our MTurk participants were personally distanced from both 
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the fantasy condition (fictional distance and temporal distance) and the realistic condition 
(temporal distance). The narrative in question featured the acquisition of a job straight out of 
college; the intervening years for some of the participants may have elicited distance of a similar 
magnitude, compared to current college students whose acquisition of a job is a salient concern. 
Future research is needed to investigate the role that temporal distance—and other forms, such as 
geographical distance—play in moral judgment. 
 Another difference found across Study 1 and Study 2 involves the interaction between 
gender and condition: a significant interaction was found in Study 1, but not in either Study 2 or 
Study 3. As noted in prior work, women possess higher moral identity and lower moral 
disengagement (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Clark & Dawson, 1996; Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 
2008; Trzebiatowska & Bruce, 2012), yet in Studies 2 and 3, men and women did not differ, 
either in third-party moral judgment or in choice in an interactive story. It should be noted, 
however, that a key limitation of our study was the reliance of a single narrative (acquiring a job 
out of college), with only two options at each choice point. A greater assortment of options and a 
greater variety of moral dilemmas encountered may prove useful in probing any individual or 
gender differences that may exist.  
For example, instead of offering participants a choice between committing a moral action 
for personal gain and refraining from committing that action, participants could be offered a third 
option—behaving morally at personal cost—to examine whether there are gender differences in 
altruistic behavior and whether a tendency to make altruistic in-story choices depends on the 
realism of the story context. Similarly, with respect to third-party judgment, it would be 
interesting to know whether participants differ in their judgment of fictional moral behavior, as 
well as fictional immoral behavior. If immoral actions committed in a realistic fictional context 
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are seen as worse than those committed in a fantastical context, are moral action committed in 
realistic contexts likewise seen as more moral than their fantastical counterparts? Future research 
is needed to explore these questions. 
 A second limitation of the current studies that needs to be addressed is that the 
“interactive” story was not, in fact, interactive. Participants were given choices about how to 
behave in-story, but those choices yielded identical consequences, regardless of how the 
participants proceeded. It is possible that allowing participants to “succeed” while making the 
more moral choice decreases any motivation that might exist to behave immorally; thus, future 
research is needed to examine whether more significant differences may be found in cases where 
immoral behavior is more clearly incentivized in-story.  
 Another limitation worth consideration is that, in Study 3, there was only one measure in 
regard to evaluating the fictional character’s behavior. We focused specifically on moral 
evaluation; absent was a measure of liking for the character who was committing said behavior, 
which would have further elaborated on the influence of context on views of characters who 
behave badly. Future research incorporating the role that fantasy content may play in moral 
disengagement (e.g., Janicke & Raney, 2018; Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogel, 2013; Sanders & Tsay-
Vogel, 2016) and Affective Disposition Theory (e.g., Raney, 2004, 2017; Zillman & Cantor, 
1977; Zillman, 2000) could be fruitful. Future studies that incorporate established fictional 
characters would also be interesting; much has been discussed about characters such as Walter 
White, Frank Underwood, and Tony Soprano (e.g., Salgaro & Tourhout, 2018; Vaage, 2015), all 
of whom live in realistic story worlds; however, it would be interesting to see if even more moral 
latitude is given to characters in fantasy contexts, such as those on Game of Thrones. 
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 Despite these limitations, the results presented here contribute to a growing body of work 
examining how morality is imported into fictional contexts and suggest that the extent to which a 
reader is transported influences not only their actions in a story-world, but also their third-party 
evaluations of fictional violations. Strikingly, the current results may have applications outside 
the domain of reading.  For example, might actions taken in MMORPGs (massive multiplayer 
online role-playing games) be held to different standards, depending on the player’s immersion 
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Table 1.  
Wording of items on which male participants were more likely to commit moral violations in the 
fantasy condition in Study 1. Fantasy context appears in bold. 
Choice Point 
2 
Prior to your astral interview, you use your crystal ball to do research on the 
wizard you are scheduled to be interviewed by and discover it is a person 
who was hired by the company around this time last year. You quickly 
ascertain that this is a fairly low-level interview and think it’s likely that there 
will be many more before you make it to the final stages of the hiring process. 
But in order to progress to that point, you will first have to receive a positive 
report from your initial interviewer: Mason Carruthers, a recent graduate 
from your magic college, who will be interviewing you and passing a report 
onto his bosses. Your research reveals that he has some pretty obvious 
prejudices against people from other magical races. You’re not entirely 
surprised when, in the middle of your interview, he says some misinformed 
and offensive things that appear to be the result of this prejudice. You 
strongly disagree with what he’s said but know that calling him on his bias 




Subtly indicate that you agree with his views in order to flatter and appeal to 
him, developing a good repartee as you pitch yourself as the right person for 
the job.  
 
Bite your tongue and say nothing about his comments, sticking to your 
talking points and pitching yourself as the right person for the job. 
Choice Point 
3 
At the mixer, you mingle with the other applicants and meet one individual 
who’s had extensive background work in the field and seems infinitely more 
qualified than yourself. Another point of interest is that they belong to the 
magical race about which Mason Carruthers made offhanded comments 




Relay the comments to the applicant to dissuade them from continuing the 
interview process, mentioning that you admire their fortitude in being willing 
to work in such an unwelcoming environment. 
 
Talk about innocuous topics such as the weather or sports. 
Choice Point 
7 
Two days later, you receive a raven from the hiring warlock that they have 
offered the job to another candidate, but letting you know that you are their 
second choice. You manage to figure out who they have made the job offer to 




Attempt to psychically manipulate the significant other of the first choice 
hire in hopes that they can convince their significant other to turn down the 
job for the sake of their relationship. 





Means, Adjusted Means, Standard Deviations and Standard Errors for Immorality Ratings in 
Study 3. 
Condition M (SD) Madj (SE) 
Realistic     
     Male 5.45 (.82) 5.46 (.10) 
     Female 5.73 (.75) 5.66 (.12) 
Fantasy     
     Male 5.26 (.90) 5.28 (.10) 
     Female 5.35 (1.13) 5.37 (.12) 

















Appendix A: Choose Your Own Adventure Paradigm 
Control -Left, Fantasy -Right 




































Choice 6: Divulge Secret 
 
 













Appendix B: Transportation 
Please think of the story you just read while you complete the questionnaire below, indicating the 
extent to which you agree with the statements.  (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
 
While I was reading the story, I could easily picture the events in it taking place. 
          
While I was reading the story, activity going on in the room around me was on my mind. (R) 
    
I could picture myself in the scene of the events described in the story.    
     
I was mentally involved in the story while reading it. 
          
After the story ended, I found it easy to put it out of my mind. (R)  
          
I wanted to learn how the story ended. 
          
The story affected me emotionally. 
          
I found myself thinking of ways the story could have turned out differently. 
          
I found my mind wandering while reading the story. (R) 
          
The events in the story are relevant to my everyday life. 
          
The events in the story have changed my life. 
          











Appendix C: Short Dark Triad 
 
Please rate your agreement or disagreement with each item using the following 
guidelines. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 






1. It's not wise to tell your secrets.  
2. I like to use clever manipulation to get my way.  
3. Whatever it takes, you must get the important people on your side.  
4. Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful in the future.  
5. It’s wise to keep track of information that you can use against people later.  
6. You should wait for the right time to get back at people.  
7. There are things you should hide from other people because they don’t need to know. 
8. Make sure your plans benefit you, not others. 
9. Most people can be manipulated. 
 
Narcissism subscale 
1. People see me as a natural leader.  
2. I hate being the center of attention. (R) 
3. Many group activities tend to be dull without me.   
4. I know that I am special because everyone keeps telling me so.  
5. I like to get acquainted with important people.  
6. I feel embarrassed if someone compliments me. (R) 
7. I have been compared to famous people.  
8. I am an average person. (R) 





1. I like to get revenge on authorities. 
2. I avoid dangerous situations. (R) 
3. Payback needs to be quick and nasty.  
4. People often say I’m out of control.  
5. It’s true that I can be mean to others.  
6. People who mess with me always regret it. 
7. I have never gotten into trouble with the law. (R) 
8. I enjoy having sex with people I hardly know  
9. I’ll say anything to get what I want. 
